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I. INTRODUCTION: CULTURAL RIGHTS
In an essay originally published in 1955, H.L.A. Hart was able to
locate virtually any right within one of two categories. Hart de-
scribed "special rights" as those rights that arise in virtue of particular
transactions between persons, or in virtue of some special relation-
ship in which individuals stand to one another. In contrast with spe-
cial rights, Hart described "general rights," or those rights (e.g., free-
dom of speech, due process of law) that arise simply in virtue of "the
equal right of all men to be free. 3 The critical distinction between
these two broad categories of rights is to be found in their differing
scopes. Special rights serve the interests of, and impose duties upon,
only those certain individuals privately involved with one another.
General rights are held in common by all persons and thus serve the
interests of, and impose duties upon, everyone.
Almost fifty years since Hart invoked his famous typology, the uni-
verse of rights is a less tidy place. Whether by virtue of a heightened
sensitivity to the increasingly pluralistic character of modern societies,
or by virtue of an escalating politicization of group identities from
within (or, what is more likely, both), rights which in Hart's terms
could be described neither as special nor as fully general have become
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2 Id. at 183.
3 Id. at 187-88.
JOURNAL OF CONSTTIONAL LAW
mainstays of liberal democracies throughout the world.4  In the
United States, in particular, we have recognized, among others, rights
to affirmative action, rights based on particularized economic status,
rights granted exclusively to members of native tribes, rights against
discrimination on the basis of some group-differentiated characteris-
tic (e.g., disability), and rights to religious conduct exemptions from
generally applicable laws. Each of these rights is accorded to indi-
viduals not on the basis of special transactions, nor simply in virtue of
the rights-bearers' common humanity; rather, each of these rights is
accorded to individuals in virtue of their particular membership in
some social group.
Though many, if not all, of these group-differentiated rights re-
main highly controversial, there is little question that they have be-
come prominent features of our jural landscape. And as an expan-
sive array of social groups continue to remonstrate for official
recognition and accommodation, more such rights surely will follow.
In his new book, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multi-
culturalism, Brian Barry laments in particular those group-
differentiated rights that ground their differentiation on the basis of
cultural attachments, including religious practices.3 In an often re-
freshing response to the scores of books and articles from theorists of
the politics of difference, the politics of recognition and especially
multiculturalism that virtually sprouted during the previous decade,6
Barry defends his own brand of universalistic citizenship, carefully
cultivated in his two previous and highly significant books on liberal
justice, Theories ofjustice and Justice as Impartiality, and here extended
to contend with some of the most divisive issues of the moment.
"The core of this conception of citizenship," writes Barry, "already
4 For discussions of collective rights, see generally WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995); VERNON VAN DYKE, HUMAN
RIGHTS, ETHNICrY, AND DISCRIMINATION (1985); THE RIGHMS OF MINORITY CULTURES (Will
Kymlicka ed., 1995). For discussions of collective aspects of rights, see generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 207 (1986); D.N. MacCormick, Rights in Legislation, in LAW, MORALITY,
AND SOCIETY: ESSAY IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 189, 204 (P.M.S. Hacker &J. Raz eds., 1977);
Eric J. Mitnick, Taking Rights Spherically: Formal and Collective Aspects of Legal Rights, 34 WAKE
FORESTL. REV. 409 (1999).
BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURALISM
(2001).
6 See, e.g., R.D. GRILLO, PLURALISM AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE: STATE, CULTURE, AND
ETHNICITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECIVE (1998); KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra
note 4; NOMOS 39: ETHNICrTY AND GROUP RIGHTS (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997);
BHIKHU PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: CULTURAL DIVERsITY AND POLITICAL
THEORY (2000); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990); Charles
Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
BRIAN BARRY, THEORIES OFJUSTICE (1989).
8 BRIAN BARRY, JUSIICEAS IMPARTIALITY (1995).
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worked out in the eighteenth century, is that there should be only
one status of citizen (no estates or castes), so that everybody enjoys
the same legal and political rights."9 Rights accorded on the basis of
cultural group membership contradict these egalitarian liberal
norms, ignore enlightenment virtues and the lessons painfully there
learned and, as such, risk a reprise of the sort of sectarian conflict
that characterized pre-liberal eras.' ° Cultural rights, and the multicul-
turalists who propound them, are thus, Barry argues, self-defeating.
Where many theorists of difference may indeed have misguidedly
abandoned liberalism on the march to justify multicultural political
programs, Barry, it seems, has rather adamantly remained tethered to
an exceedingly procedural and so unduly thin conception of liberal-
ism. Barry is correct to criticize certain difference theorists for some
of the more extreme and illiberal elements of their political agenda,
but many of the proposals offered by multiculturalists would find,
and indeed have found, a congenial home in a less impoverished
conception of liberalism." In certain respects, the comments that fol-
low will merely quibble with Barry's otherwise quite sensible and
penetrating rejoinder to illiberal multicultural policy proposals and
the theories that are said to underlie them. In other respects, this cri-
tique will run more deeply. But it is only an insignificant book that
fails to generate substantial criticism. And Culture and Equality, assur-
edly, is not an insignificant work.
In Part II, I outline the major strands of Barry's conception of lib-
eral justice, and the sense in which he relates that universalistic con-
ception to multicultural claims. In Part III, I take up Barry's treat-
ment of the concept of group rights, particularly his critique of
religious conduct exemptions, and the distinctions he then attempts
to draw between cultural and non-cultural group-differentiated
rights. Ultimately, I suggest that Barry's theory would impose too
substantial (and too illiberal!) a loss on individual associative free-
dom and on the capacity of persons for self-invention. I conclude in
Part IV by drawing from Barry's overly restrictive analysis of cultural
rights, and from the uncompromising cultural claims propounded by
his multiculturalist targets, to the need for a more just, and more lib-
eral, mediating theory of membership.
9 BARRY, supra note 5, at 7.
10 See id at 20-21 (discussing religious conflict in the 16th and 17th centuries).
11I have in mind here voices as distinct as those ofJoseph Raz, see Multiculturalism: A Liberal
Perspective, inEMICSINTEPUBuCDOMAIN: ESSAYS INTHE MORAIlIYOFLAWAND POLITICS 170-
91 (1994); George Kateb, see The Value of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35-63 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1998); and Wfll Kymlicka, seeMULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 4.
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II. JUSTICE AND DIFFERENCE
A. Universalistic Liberalism
Brian Barry has contributed a great deal to our knowledge ofjus-
tice.12 His conception of justice as defined by that set of principles
capable of earning the universal assent of reasonable persons is de-
rived in significant form from Bawls, though he has parted company
both with the later Bawls and with Rawls's most famous methodologi-
cal invention, the Original Position.13 I trust that the outlines of
Bawls's approach are sufficiently familiar that I need not expound
upon them at any great length here. Suffice it to say that in an effort
to arrive at principles the fairness of which reasonably can be en-
dorsed by all, Rawls posits a hypothetical situation in which a collec-
tion of persons, ignorant of their own particular characteristics, at-
tachments and conceptions of in what a valuable life would consist,
14collectively arrive at general prescriptions for a just society. The
genius of Rawls's device is, of course, that, ignorant of their own iden-
tities, the persons in the original position cannot pursue their par-
ticular ends but will instead have a strong incentive to consider the
plight of every person, since they might in fact be any person.
One of the virtues of Culture and Equality, then, is Barry's defense
of Rawls's theory against the oft-repeated charge that Bawls is uncon-
cerned with difference. 15 Barry shows, to the contrary, that "Rawls
builds his entire structure around the assumption that the main busi-
ness of a theory of justice is to deal with difference in a manner that
can be shown to be fair."'6 Ignorant of any aspect of their own lives,
Rawls's hypothetical citizens are indeed forced to consider other ways
of life. Of course, Rawls remains open to the charge that his theory is
unsuccessful in this regard. While Rawls might not have overlooked
the existence of difference in designing his schema for the derivation
of just principles, that is a long way from establishing that Rawls's
theory really is capable of accounting for fundamental differences in
outlook and conceptions of morality among distinct groups of per-
sons. Indeed, Barry's own critique of Bawls, most strongly put in his
Justice as Impartiality, recognizes that while the principles derived
through Rawls's apparatus might command universal assent behind a
"veil of ignorance," once that veil is lifted, and the participants again
12 See supra notes 9 and 10.
13 See BARRY, supra note 5, at 16 (noting that Barry's egalitarian liberalism was influenced by
and related to Rawls's theory ofjustice); id at 331 n.27 (stating disagreement with Rawls's writ-
ings since 1975); BARRY, supra note 8, at 57-61 (criticizing Rawls's Original Position).
14 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORYOFJUSTICE 136-42 (1971) ("The Veil of Ignorance").
15 See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 6, at 104.
16 BARRY, supra note 5, at 69.
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become aware of their particular statuses, it becomes perfectly ra-
tional for individuals to disavow their prior assent.17  Thus, argues
Barry, while Rawls clearly is concerned with difference, his theory
nevertheless fails ultimately to take differences among persons seri-
ously.
18
Like Rawls, however, Barry is most fundamentally interested in de-
riving principles of justice that will allow persons with highly diver-
gent interests, attitudes and conceptions of the good to live together
amicably-and amicably not simply because a peaceable existence is
forced upon them, but because everyone will be capable of recogniz-
ing that whatever disputes do arise will be adjudicated according to
principles that all can appreciate as fair. 9 But unlike Rawls's strategy
of hypothetical self-ignorance, Barry attempts to deal with the inevi-
table persistence of conflicting conceptions of the good by inquiring
what it is that even persons highly aware of their own strong differ-
ences might agree upon as a fair way of conducting public life.2 To
take one example that becomes particularly prominent in Culture and
Equality, it will surely be the case that among different religious
groups there will be many different modes of expressing one's faith.
An Orthodox Jew will want to observe the dietary laws of kashrut, a
Sikh will seek freedom to wear an appropriate head covering, a Rasta-
farian might request accommodation of the ritual smoking of mari-
juana, and so on.2' Any claim by any particular group that their mode
of religious practice is uniquely good, and, as such, should be pro-
tected to the exclusion of all or even any of the others, is obviously
unlikely to command universal assent.22 What is required, then, says
Barry, is a move among all groups to a higher level of abstraction.2
We must seek a principle that no member of any particular religious
group, including that group composed of persons who wish for them-
selves to remain free of religious doctrine, could reasonably reject.24
The first step in locating such a principle is recognizing the cen-
tral role that religious belief may play in persons' lives. As Barry sug-
17 BARR, supra note 8, at 59.
Is Id
19 See BARRY, supra note 5, at 122; BARRY, supra note 8, at 77.
2 See BARRY, supra note 5, at 122 ("I suggest simply that liberal principles are the fairest way
of adjudicating the disputes that inevitably arise as a result of conflicting interests and incom-
patible beliefs about the social conditions of the good life."); BARRY, supra note 8, at 67.
21 These and other religious claims are treated throughout Culture and Equality. See, e.g.,
BARRY, supra note 5, at 40-50 (discussingJewish dietary and Sikh head covering observances); id.
at 3940 (discussing Rastafarians' ritual use of marijuana).
2 See BARRY, supra note 8, at 82.
23 Id. at 84.
24 Id. at 67. In this sense, Barry's theory of justice is derivative of Thomas Scanlon's recon-
struction of Rawls's contractualist ideas. See Thomas Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism,
in UTIUTARIANISMAND BEYOND 103 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
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gests, "From the point of view of virtually any conception of the good,
the possibility of practicing the form of religious worship in which
one believes (or practicing none if one's beliefs lead in that direc-
tion) will be regarded as an important component of the good life.
"25
Given this critical commonality among persons, the second step then
involves deriving a principle with respect to freedom of religious wor-
ship that is able to elicit general consent. Neither eating only foods
prepared in a certain fashion, nor the wearing of certain clothing,
nor the universal absence of any of these religious requirements, can
elicit such consent. Rather, it is only the more general prescription,
the equal freedom of all to practice, or, as the case may be, not practice
their religion, that cannot reasonably be rejected. "If freedom to
worship in the way you think right is of great importance to your own
ability to live what you regard as a good life, then you are asked to ac-
cept that it is important to others too."
26
Given the extent to which he acknowledges the critical impor-
tance of religious freedom to human well-being in Justice as Impartial-
ity, Barry's sweeping rejection in Culture and Equality of religious con-
duct exemptions from generally applicable laws might strike readers
of both books as incongruous. On the one hand, Barry in Justice as
Impartiality argued quite strenuously that "religious belief... is at the
core of self-identity, and [that] if its expression is denied it leaves a
gap in life that cannot be filled in any alternative way."2 And yet, on
the other hand, much of Culture and Equality is dedicated specifically
to rejecting claims of religious groups for public accommodation of
their religious practices, at least where those practices are contrary to
generally applicable law.2 Indeed, the argument here is not simply
that claims for religious conduct exemptions often constitute bad
policy decisions (though that argument is nearly ever-present as
well). Rather, Barry argues in Culture and Equality that the accommo-
dation of religious practice is simply not a concern from the perspec-
tive of liberal justice, at all29 Thus, where a particular religious prac-
tice-say, the ritual ingestion of peyote ---has been prohibited
generally, Barry would deny even that an exemption from the more
general law might be required as a matter ofjustice. And he would do
25 BARRY, supra note 8, at 82.
2Id. at 84.
27 d
See BARRY, supra note 7, at 19-62, 155-93.
2Id. at 33 ("But I shall reject the characteristic case made by the supporters of multicultur-
alism, that a correct analysis would show exemptions for cultural minorities to be required in a
great many cases by egalitarian liberal justice.")
30 See discussion of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in BARRY, supra note 5,
at 169-73, 183-87. See also infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
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so despite his previous recognition of the "ap in life" this denial
would cause at the very "core of self-identity."
How is it that Barry can both affirm the critical importance for
human life of religious exercise, and yet deny that public accommo-
dation of religious practice is a concern of liberaljustice? The answer
lies, it would seem, in the extreme stress that Barry's theory of justice
places on the universalistic treatment of difference. Recall that, as
derived by Barry, the basic prescription regarding religious freedom
capable of commanding universal assent, and so of constituting a
principle of liberal justice, is the equal freedom of all to practice or
not to practice their religion.2 A policy that would afford a special
exemption to any particular religious group, according to Barry's ar-
gument, would not be affording equal freedom to all, but rather
would be treating one group more favorably than the rest.3 Thus,
the move asserted by Barry from a lower to a higher level of general-
ity-in this case, from a group-specific claim of free religious practice
to the more general claim of equal religious freedom for all-results
also in a requirement that, as a matter of justice, different groups
must face uniform laws.
But what sort of liberalism is it that excludes from consideration a
matter that cuts to the very core of individual well-being? It is, as
Barry has readily admitted, a theory of "strictly limited ambitions. ' 4
And so what then becomes of those many questions that are not sus-
ceptible to analysis strictly on the basis of substantive principles that
can command universal (reasonable) assent? In that broad range of
substantive issues, where individuals reasonably will disagree regard-
ing morally charged outcomes, Barry asserts that resort must be had
to fair decision procedures. And in what will these procedures con-
sist? Fair decision procedures are those that accord to each citizen an
equal right to participate in democratic politics.
Notice, then, just how far we have come from Barry's initial af-
firmation of religious freedom. Freedom to worship (or not to wor-
ship) according to the tenets of one's faith is of great, and even self-
defining, importance to all persons. Yet, because the value of any
particular religious practice is incapable of garnering universal as-
sent, liberal justice must remain remote from the claim of any given
group to the free practice of their religion. Instead, the practitio-
ners' claim, which in all likelihood will be brought by a minority relig-
ious group, must be decided according to majority will. Barry's con-
31 Seesupra note 29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
See BARRY, supra note 5, at 34; BARRY, supra note 8, at 164.
54 BARI, supra note 8, at 113.
S See BARRY, supra note 5, at 79.
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ception of liberal justice is thus open not only to charge that it is
radically underdeterminative on the great mass of issues affecting so-
cial life, but that on each of those issues it very well likely sacrifices
individual freedom to majority will.
B. Against the Politics ofDifference
In Barry's defense, the motivation behind his exceedingly thin,
procedurally-oriented brand of liberalism is manifestly not to injure
minority religious and cultural groups, but to moderate the sort of
social conflict that did in fact injure minority religious and cultural
groups in the pre-liberal past. "In fact," as he indicates in Culture and
Equality, Barry's favored universalistic "model of citizenship was de-
veloped in response to the wars of religion that made much of
Europe a living hell in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. If it
could bring those conflicts to an end-and on the whole it did-it is
not at all apparent why it should not be up to the task of coping with
religious and cultural differences now."3 The relegation of religious
and cultural group difference to private life, and with it, the acute
depoliticization of difference, is conceived of by Barry as the only way
to ensure the continued existence of a public climate in which minor-
ity groups can endure.
"In contrast," Barry claims, "the 'politics of difference' is a formula
for manufacturing conflict, because it rewards the groups that can
most effectively mobilize to make claims on the polity ... 3,8 And
here Barry may have a point, at least with respect to some of the more
illiberal claims made by difference theorists. Take for example the
rather extreme charge, asserted by certain of those who press for a
politics of difference, that a lack of group proportionality in positions
of high social status automatically entails injustice.3 Now we need to
be careful about what specifically this claim entails. This claim does
not assert that group disproportionality in positions of high status
might be an indication of discrimination and injustice. That claim
Barry's liberalism clearly can accommodate. 4° This claim also does
not assert merely that a program of affirmative action is required as a
matter of justice. Again, Barry concedes the likelihood, and the le-
gitimacy, of this prospect as well (while citing, on the other hand, Iris
Marion Young's assertion that even "'strong affirmative action' pro-
3 Id. at 21.
37 Id. at 32.
3 Id- at 21.
q See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 6, at 29.
40 See BARRY, supra note 5, at 93 (arguing that the relative lack of women in "top corporate




grammes" would provide an insufficient remedy). 41 Rather, differ-
ence theorists, following Young, press a conception of social justice
commensurate only with a strict equality of outcomes, regardless of the
cause for the inequality.42 The question arises, though, whether dif-
ferent outcomes across cultural groups might be the result of cultural
norms themselves, and, if so, whether this-without more-can rea-
sonably be stated as an occasion of injustice.
In his critique of Young's demand for the imposition of strictly
equal success rates across groups, Barry observes that there likely will
be cultural group-based affinities that do not coincide with conven-
tional conceptions of what constitutes a successful career or life-
plan.43 To appreciate Barry's point, imagine, for instance, that a
given individual's culture places great value in the intimate relation-
ship that is said to exist between human beings and the land. It is not
unimaginable, then, that a greater than representative proportion of
persons from this particular cultural group might become involved in
careers tied to the land, say as park rangers, landscape architects, en-
vironmental consultants, etc. What then is the appropriate response
to the significantly smaller relative proportion of persons from this
cultural group in, say, the medical profession? A disproportionately
low number of persons from a particular group might be an indica-
tion of discrimination, and to the extent it is discrimination on the
basis of cultural group membership that is causing the imbalance,
then, Barry claims, in accordance with liberal justice, the law should
provide a remedy. Further, we may for a number of reasons decide
that a program of affirmative action is required, perhaps on the basis
of past discrimination or because it would be beneficial for members
of this cultural group to see doctors within their cultural communi-
ties. To the extent that the imbalance in the medical profession is
due to a lack of educational opportunities or other resources in the
given community necessary to qualify for entrance, public policies
should be addressed to remove these impediments. Finally, we might
press for even more fundamental economic reforms, such that the
lack of proportionality between professions will not result in highly
disproportionate rates of income. All of this is potentially consistent
with Barry's conception ofjustice.44 "The egalitarian liberal position,"
says Barry, "is that justice requires equal rights and opportunities but
41 See id. at 13, 94.
4 SeeYOUNG, supra note 6, at 29.
Barry, for instance, points to the disproportionately high number of Sikhs in Britain who
cluster in the construction industry. See BARRY, supra note 5, at 98.
4See id. at 90-98 (arguing that justice requires equal opportunity, not equal outcome), 108
("[T]here is nothing in the general conception of liberalism that commits it to underwriting
whatever economic inequalities a society may attach to different occupational positions.").
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not necessarily equal outcomes defined over groups."45 What is be-
yond the scope of liberal justice, however, is that which the aspira-
tions of difference theorists like Young would apparently require: the
imposition of "an identical distribution of achievement-motivations
within each group." 46
A second strikingly illiberal plank in the recent multiculturalist
agenda that Barry takes special issue with in Culture and Equality in-
volves testing the limits of freedom of speech against cultural group-
based sensitivities. This issue arose in the last decade particularly in
light of the uproar caused by the publication of Salman Rushdie's
novel, The Satanic Verses.47 Bhikhu Parekh has argued that the right to
freedom of speech has been justified only in light of the personal in-
terests of intellectual elites (i.e., the writers) themselves, and that free
speech must instead be "balanced against... [the] self-respect and
dignity of individuals and groups."8 A related argument, identified
here by Barry, maintains that because religious beliefs "are constitu-
tive of persons, 'to undermine and despise their beliefs is simultane-
ously to undermine and despise their selves. Freedom of speech
should be devoted to, and also limited by, the promotion of mutual
understanding between different communities of believers."' 49 With
respect to both of these claims, however, we can readily concede that
an individual's membership in a particular religious or cultural group
may constitute a critical aspect of that individual member's identity,
while at the same time remaining extremely anxious over the ex-
traordinary constraints on speech contemplated by these arguments.
If countenanced, the group dignity argument could, in effect, pro-
vide a rationale for the curtailment of any speech critical of any relig-
ious or cultural practice. In response, Barry defends a broad right to
freedom of speech specifically on the basis that criticism of group-
oriented beliefs and practices is itself valuable. "The case against all
this," he writes, "is that a society owes its members the opportunity-
whether they choose to avail themselves of it or not-of changing
4 Id. at 92.
4 Id at 95.
47 See SAvIJAN RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES (1989). For discussions of the political theo-
retical issues raised by the Rushdie affair, see especially the three volumes of papers delivered at
seminars before the British Commission for Racial Equality. BRITAIN: A PLURAL SOCIEIY
(Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1990); FREE SPEECH (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1990); LAW, BLASPHEMY AND THE
MULTI-FAITH SOC=IT (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1990). For a useful critical review of these works, see
PeterJones, Rushdie, Race and Religion, 38 POL STUD. 687 (1990).
48 PAREKH, supra note 6, at 320. This argument is treated by BARRY, supra note 5, at 30.
49 BARRY, supra note 5, at 30 (quoting Jones, supra note 47, at 689). Note, however, that
Jones was merely describing, rather than pressing, the argument advanced by Susan Mendus in
The Tigers of Wrath and the Horses of Instruction. See Mendus, The Tigers of Wrath and the Horses of
Instruction, in FREE SPEECH, supra note 47, at 3-17.
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their minds in matters of religious belief, and that this entails more
than the absence of legal sanctions against apostasy."'
Barry's defense of liberal justice is thus, at times, edifying, and his
reply to liberalism's more extreme multicultural critics is often largely
persuasive. The essential question we are left with, however, is who
will defend liberal justice against Barry's own procedural liberalism?
III. LIBERALJUSTICE AND CULTURAL IDENTIY
A. Rights and Groups
To begin to appreciate the loss imposed by Barry's universalistic
conception of liberalism, we need to consider more closely the intri-
cate relationship that exists between rights and groups. Rights are of-
ten afforded to individuals on the basis of group membership. At the
outset, to determine whether a given individual can be said to possess
a right, we must first consult the investitive criteria indicated by the
right itself.51 For example, for all of the rights granted under the U.S.
Constitution, the investitive criterion is either that of citizenship or
personhood. So, depending upon the right at issue, one must either
be a "citizen" (e.g., the right to vote or hold certain offices) or a con-
stitutional "person" (e.g., the rights to freedom of speech, due proc-
ess, equal protection, etc.) to exercise constitutional rights.5 For
common law rights-claims, investitive criteria typically develop over
the course of a long series of particular cases, and generally require
for their discernment analogical reference from the private arrange-
ments and circumstances that characterize the present case to those
that characterized previous such cases. 53 For legislative rights-claims,
the investitive criteria are explicit from the outset, though interpre-
tive ambiguities often force a more casuistic approach.54 But in each
5 BARRY, supra note 5, at 30.
5 See MacCormick, supra note 4, at 204.
52 See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 4 (eligibility for office of President limited to citizens); U.S.
CONST. amend. X1V (equal protection and due process afforded to persons); U.S. CONST.
amend. XV (right to vote limited to citizens). Though First Amendment freedoms are not af-
forded explicitly to persons, we naturally infer that result. U.S. CONSF. amend I ("Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech"). All of the following categories of
human beings have been deemed, at one time or another, to consist of non-persons for legal
purposes: slaves, prisoners, sailors, lepers, excommunicates, Jews, Quakers, the terminally ill,
the mentally disabled, children, persons born outside of wedlock, and aliens. See MARTHA
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE- INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 127 (1990);
see also infra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the Dred Scott case).
For a discussion of the role of analogy in legal reasoning, see CASS R_ SUNSIEIN, LEGAL
REASONRIGAND POLITICAL CONFLICT 62-100 (1996).
54 See, e.g., LON L FULLER, THE ANATOMY OF THE LAW 126 (Penguin Books 1971) (1968)
(comparing the processes of legislation and adjudication); H.LA. HART, THE CONCET OF LAW
127-28 (2d ed. 1994) (noting presence of"open texture" in legislation).
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of these situations, indeed in any situation in which a right is af-
forded, it is afforded not merely to a given individual but to that full
set of individuals who match the appropriate investitive criteria. 5 In-
deed, a different result would violate the very concept of law as a sys-
tem of general rules.56 Surely, however, that the rule of law mandates
the formal categorization of all rights-bearers into groups need not
mean that all (or any) rights are "group rights." 7 Yet when the inves-
titive criteria indicated by a right happen to coincide with member-
ship in a particular cultural group, it has become common, particu-
larly among theorists of difference and multiculturalism, to speak of
such cultural rights as group rights.!;
In Culture and Equality, Barry takes strong exception to this ten-
dency. "Cultures are simply not the kind of entity to which rights can
properly be ascribed. Communities defined by some shared cultural
characteristic (for example, a language) may under some circum-
stances have valid claims, but the claims then arise from the legiti-
mate interests of the members of the group.' '59 For Barry, then, there
can be "no question of 'group rights"' until there is in fact some
"corporate entity that receives special treatment."6° Thus, efforts to
describe religious conduct exemptions-for example, exemptions
granted to Sikhs so that they may wear turbans rather than crash
helmets while riding motorcycles-as "group rights" are misguided.6
This is so because it is not the group itself but each Sikh individually
who exercises the exemption. Similarly, although a preferential ad-
missions program may be predicated upon the asserted interests of
an entire ethnic, racial or other-defined group-whether on the as-
sumption that certain communities are being underserved or role
models are needed or even that the preference system will improve
the status of members of the social group more generally-the pro-
gram itself still merely confers benefits on individuals rather than on
any group as such. 62 Hence, claims Barry, it is meaningless to talk of
these rights, which are admittedly conferred on the basis of group
membership, as group rights.6
55 See MacCormick, supra note 4, at 204.
6 On the generality of law, see LONL. FULLER, THEMORALrIYOF LAW 46-49 (rev. ed. 1969).
57 See Mitnick, supra note 4 (in virtue of formal justice, rights sort individuals into groups).
See, e.g., THE RIGHTS OF MINORITYCULTURES, supra note 4.
59 BARRY, supra note 5, at 67.
60 Id. at 113.
61 & at 112.
SId at 113.
63 For an argument conceiving of rights in collective terms, see KYMUCKA, MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP, supra note 4. For an argument against the characterization of even group-held
rights as "group rights," seeJeremy Waldron, Can Communal Goods Be Human Rights?, in LIBERAL
RIGHTS 339 (1993).
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While it seems wise to reserve the concept of a group right for
those rights which can only logically be pressed by groups qua groups,
the relationship between rights and group difference is considerably
more subtle and complex than Barry has indicated. We observed
above the sense in which rights, in virtue of their generality, inher-
ently sort persons into sets of rights-bearers.r4 What I would like to
suggest now is that, under the right conditions, rights will constitute
not merely sets of unattached rights-bearers but also social groups from
which individual rights-bearers derive aspects of their identities.6
Recall first that the scope of any set engendered by the official
recognition of a right is, in a formal sense, directly contingent on the
investitive criteria indicated by the right itself.6 Consider, then, in-
vestitive criteria that straightforwardly protect the interests only of a
particular class of persons. For example, consider again the constitu-
tional right to vote, which is afforded in the United States only to
"citizens. 67 Though we would not characterize the right to vote as a
"group right," it nevertheless constitutes perhaps the most fundamen-
tal social group in any democratic society, that is, the citizenry. Fur-
ther, insofar as citizenship denotes full membership in a democracy,
individual rights-bearers will derive a critical aspect of their identities
from the social group described by the right itself. An individual is
likely to conceive of herself, and, indeed, to be conceived of by soci-
ety, differently in virtue of her being a rights-bearer. s The same
might be said of any right that accords benefits solely to the members
of a particular social group. Thus, welfare rights, rights to affirmative
action, rights granted exclusively to laborers, to Native Americans, to
the disabled, to religious practitioners in the form of conduct exemp-
tons, all may be said to constitute aspects of their bearers' idenuties.69
Similarly, whenever a class of persons is excluded from a given set of
rights-bearers on the basis of some ascribed characteristic, that exclu-
sion, consistent with legal generality, will result in the construction of
64 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
I discuss the relational and constitutive aspects of rights in greater detail in Ericj. Mitnick,
Constitutive Rights, 20 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 185 (2000). On the concept of the social group
more generally, see LARRY MAY, THE MORAITY OF GROUPS: COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILIY,
GROUP-BASED HAR, AND CORPORATE RIGHTS (1987); J.C. TURNER Er AL, REDISCOVERING THE
SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-CATEGORIZATION THEORY (1987); YOUNG, supra note 6, at 43-44; K. An-
thony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction, in
RETHINKING MULTICULTURALUS, supra note 6, at 150-52. Barry criticizes Young's definition of
what constitutes a social group for its reliance on an overly broad conception of culture. See
BARRY, supra note 5, at 96.
o6 SeeMacCormick, supra note 4, at 204.
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
For discussions of the impact of social perceptions on self-understanding, see STEVEN
LURES, PONER: A RADICALVIEW (1974); Taylor, supra note 6, at 25.
69 See Mitnick, supra note 65, at 197-200.
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a social group.70 History, unfortunately, is rife with examples of such
ascriptive exclusion. 7' The Dred Scott case is but perhaps the most
egregious of numerous examples wherein a category of persons, in
this case persons (slave or free) of African descent, was defined for
jural purposes to consist of "non-citizens," or in Chief Justice Taney's
words, "a subordinate and inferior class of beings."''
Of course, none of this is to say that every right, simply in virtue of
its generality, will constitute a meaningful social group. For most
rights, the sets engendered by rights will consist merely of aggregates
of individual rights-bearers. An individual vindicated in a garden va-
riety breach of contract claim, for example, is unlikely to derive any
meaningful aspect of her social identity from her inclusion in a class
of like rights-bearers. However, in the context with which Barry is
most intimately concerned-the context of religious and cultural
freedoms-even straightforward "individual rights" will constitute so-
cial groups and play an integral role in defining self-meanings. This
constitutive aspect of rights is, in itself, normatively ambiguous. It
remains to be seen whether, and when, there might be liberal virtue
in the legal construction of social groups and human identity. Barry's
extensive treatment of religious freedom offers one opportunity for
such reflection.
B. Free Exercise of Religion
As we have noted, generally applicable laws, at times, conflict with
religious obligations. When this occurs, religious practitioners are
forced to choose between following the dictates of the law or the dic-
tates of their conscience. If, in a particular case, religious obligation
is deemed by an individual practitioner to supersede her legal obliga-
tion, and she is then prosecuted or sued for violating the law, the
question arises whether, in virtue of the First Amendment's free ex-
ercise of religion clause, the government must grant the religious
practitioner a privilege to act as she did, or an exemption from the
generally applicable law. 3 The high-water mark for judicial protec-
tion of religious liberty in the form of religious conduct exemptions
occurred in Wisconsin v. Yoder, a 1972 decision in which the Court
overturned the convictions of Amish parents prosecuted for refusing
to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade, as required
70 Id. at 192, 194-96.
71 See MINOW, supra note 52; ROGERS M. SMIH, CMC IDEALS: CONFUACING VISIONS OF
CITZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1997).
7 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1856).




by a state compulsory attendance law.74 In Yoder, and indeed in virtu-
ally all such exemption cases for roughly the three decades preceding
the 1990s, the Court interpreted the free exercise clause as prescrib-
ing that a balance be struck between an individual's right freely to
practice her religion and the state's interest in restricting that prac-
tice.7 On the basis of such a balancing approach, the Court in Yoder
accepted the argument made by the Amish parents that sending their
children to school beyond the eighth grade was contrary to their way
of life, and that this way of life was itself integrally related to Amish
religious belief. Despite recognizing the state's important general in-
terest in educating its citizenry, the Court concluded that this interest
was insufficiently compelling to overcome the Amish interest in relig-
ious freedom. The Amish were thus granted an exemption from the
generally applicable compulsory school attendance law.76
Legal commentators concerned about the relationship between
Amish religious practices and contrary state laws rarely consider rele-
vant source material beyond Yoder itself, and perhaps one or two
other moderately prominent cases. 77 In strong contrast, the section
of Culture and Equality concerning free exercise claims on the part of
the Amish is enlightening specifically because of the depth of the
author's treatment.78 After surveying the history of the Amish com-
munity in the United States, and in particular the unique nature of
their faith, Barry portrays in great detail what can only be described
as a vast and highly energetic Amish political machine. Given the de-
gree to which the Amish religion and mode of existence is character-
ized by a stance of withdrawal from public life, the size and scope of
this Amish litigation and lobbying program will surprise most readers.
"The Amish account for a quite large proportion of all the religiously
based exemptions to generally applicable laws that are to be found in
the United States .... The Amish have prevailed at all levels of gov-
ernment. They have been particularly successful with State legisla-
74 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
75 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986) (balancing test resulted in
no exemption being granted from military policy prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols
while on duty); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963) (balancing test resulted in ex-
emption being granted from unemployment compensation law that required applicants to be
available to work on Saturdays in contravention of religious beliefs). But see O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-51 (1987) (prison regulation in contravention of religious obligation
not subject to balancing test, but upheld where reasonably related to a legitimate penological
interest).
16 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
77 See, e.g., State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Minn. 1990) (balancing test applied,
on basis of Minnesota Constitution, to claims by Amish that state law requiring display of reflec-
tive triangle on the back of slow moving vehicles contravened religious beliefs), treated in
BARRY, supra note 5, at 184-87.
See BARIY, supra note 5, at 176-93.
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tures... have also won concessions from administrative agencies...
[and] have created a central body, the National Steering Committee"
to coordinate the group's activities. Further, all of these efforts
"take[] place against a generally well-disposed public opinion
brought about by skillful propaganda, normally sympathetic media
coverage and the desire of the public to delude themselves about the
true character of the Amish."8 Such public delusions include, in par-
ticular, the notions that Amish farming practices are environmentally
sound (which they allegedly are not) and that the Amish lifestyle is
81one of asceticism, which, again, Barry suggests is demonstrably false.
As interesting as the material that Barry brings to bear on Amish
political practices may be, it, of course, does nothing to diminish the
relative legitimacy of the claims of the Amish to religious freedom, or
of the balancing test employed by the Court in Yoder to resolve such
claims. Further, while more telling criticisms of the result in Yoder
might have focused on the Court's failure fully to consider the inter-
ests of the Amish children in receiving a secondary education, or the
interests of a democratic state in educating potential political partici-
pants, these interests are susceptible to, rather than neglected by,
analysis pursuant to a balancing approach." In the well-known 1990
case of Employment Division v. Smith, however, the Supreme Court, in
an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, disapproved of the balancing
test for free exercise claims, and with it the prospect of judicially
mandated religious conduct exemptions from generally applicable
laws.83 After Smith, a statute would only be deemed violative of the
Free Exercise Clause if the statute specifically discriminated against a
particular religion or against all religions generally."' General laws
that merely have the effect of burdening religious practice would pre-
sent no constitutional difficulty.
While the overwhelming majority of legal commentators have
criticized the Smith decision,5 and legislation attempting to reinstate
Id. at 179-80.
80 Id. at 180-81.
81 Id. at 181.
See Kent Greenawalt, Freedom of Association and Religious Association, in FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION, supra note 11, at 124.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
&I For an example of such a case, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that city ordinance designed solely to suppress particular religious
sect's practice of animal sacrifice violated the Free Exercise clause).
According to one study, "[o]f the sixteen law review articles and notes written on the case,
all but one condemned the result." James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: An Iconoclastic Assessmen4 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1409 (1992). For arguments critical of Smith,
see Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1990); Ira C. Lupu, Re-
constructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
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the pre-Smith balancing test has been passed by nearly unanimous
margins in both houses of Congress (only to be rebuffed by the
Court),s6 Professor Barry finds in justice Scalia's reasoning an ap-
proach quite congenial to his own. Both Scalia's and Barry's inter-
pretations of the Free Exercise Clause emphasize the universalistic
legal treatment of individuals over particularized claims to religious
freedom.86 Further, both encourage resort on the part of burdened
religious practitioners to legislatively, as opposed to judicially, crafted
remedies. An initial problem with this approach, of course, is that it
effectively reduces the Free Exercise Clause to a gloss on the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses, since those clauses already pro-
tect against overt discrimination.90 A more practical problem is that,
since the vast majority of religious practitioners who run afoul of
generally applicable laws are members of minority, and in many
cases, truly fringe, religious groups, the true prospect for effective po-
litical remedies will prove quite limited.9' Nevertheless, in the face of
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990). For arguments supporting Smith, see William P. Marshall, In
Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991); Mark Tushnet, The
Rhetoric ofFree Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REV. 117 (1993).
86 SeeReligious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). The Act was
ruled an unconstitutional exertion of legislative power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in City ofBoerne v. Hores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
87 See BARRY, supra note 5, at 169-73.
83 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 ("To make an individual's obligation to obey... [generally ap-
plicable) law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the
State's interest is 'compelling'-permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto
himself,'... contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense" (quoting Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879))); BARRY, supra note 5, at 171 ("This is broadly in line
with the position that I took in chapter 2 to the effect that justice (in the form of equal treat-
ment) and freedom of religion do not require exemptions from generally applicable laws sim-
ply on the basis of their having a differential effect on people according to their beliefs, norms,
compulsions or preferences.").
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to
religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation"); BARRY, supra
note 5, at 171 ("a legislature might quite properly decide to make an exemption").
90 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("nor shall any state ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. .."). See also Larry Alexander,
Good God, Carvey! The Inevitability and Impossibility of a Religious Justification of Free Exercise Exemp-
tions, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 35, 35 (1998) ("[T]he heart of the Free Exercise Clause is the right to
judicially-mandated exemptions from general laws for those whose religion mandates conduct
contrary to such laws. And Employment Division v. Smith cut the heart out of the Free Exercise
Clause."); The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases: L Constitutional Law; C. Free Exercise of
Religion, 104 HARV. L. REV. 198, 205 (1990) ("Interpreted strongly, this conclusion reduces the
free exercise clause to a virtual nullity"); ef. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (SouterJ., concurring) ("hybrid exception would probably be so vast
as to swallow the Smith rule .... ").
91 Writing for the majority in Smith, Justice Scalia explicitly acknowledges this prospect.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 ("It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process
will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged
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non-universal assent on reasonably contestable issues, the sacrifice of
individual freedom to majoritarian decision procedures is precisely
what Barry's universalistic conception of liberal justice prescribes.9
At the same time that Barry maintains that claims for religious
conduct exemptions cannot be justified on the basis of principles of
liberal justice, he is also compelled to acknowledge that a given stat-
ute might "bear[] particularly harshly on some people, [and that]
that is at the very least a reason for examining it to see if it might be
modified so as to accommodate those who are affected by it in some
special way."93 In such an event, though an exemption will not be re-
quired as a matter of justice, Barry suggests that an exemption might
be justifiable on the basis of prudence or generosity.9 For example,
Barry actually endorses a current exemption from legal regulations
governing the construction industry that permits members of the
Sikh religious sect to continue to wear turbans rather than hard hats
on work sites in Great Britain.95 In the absence of the exemption,
Sikhs would be forced to choose between continuing to observe their
religious obligations and continuing to maintain their livelihood.
But Barry's purpose in describing the hard hat exemption is not to
propose it as a generalizable model for the alleviation of special hard-
ship, but rather to suggest the remarkable rarity ofjustifiable conduct
exemptions. Indeed, this is the only individualized exemption that
gains Barry's favor in Culture and Equality, and it does so only because
nearly half of all male Sikhs living in Great Britain are employed in
the construction trade.96
Barry articulates his rationale for the presumed rarity ofjustifiable
religious conduct exemptions (again, justifiable on the ground of
prudence or generosity rather than justice), and more generally the
impropriety of the "Rule-and-Exemption Approach" itself,9 on the
basis of what he terms a "pincer movement." It will almost invariably
be the case, Barry argues, either: (1) that the concern thatjustifies a
general law is sufficiently imperative to overcome any claim to an ex-
emption; or (2) that the interest that justifies affording the exemp-
in .... "). Barry suggests, however, that at least well-organized religious groups will be successful
in the political arena. See BARRY, supra note 5, at 39 ("Any open political system... is inevitably
subject to lobbying by minority groups with a special interest in some aspect of public policy. It
very often happens that there is no similarly well-organized group on the other side.").
See supra note 34.
BARRY, supra note 5, at 38-39.
94 Id. at 39.
9 Id. at 171.
Id. Barry also acknowledges the justifiability of an exemption from laws governing em-
ployment discrimination to enable religious groups to employ only members of their religion as
leaders. Id. at 167-68.
For a discussion of the rule and exemption approach, see id. at 40-50.
% Id. at 167.
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tion is of sufficient weight to overcome the case for having the law at
all.? Thus, either there will be a strong argument from social utility
which justifies the law as applied to all, or there will be a strong liber-
tarian argument in favor of, in effect, extending the exemption to the
point where it swallows the rule.
Barry has anticipated the strongest argument that can be made
against the first prong of his pincer movement, the argument from
religious freedom, but his response is less than satisfying. We are
asked to consider, for example, generally applicable regulations on
the slaughtering of animals that contradict religious dictates on the
subject. In a majority of western countries, exemptions from such
regulations have been provided to accommodate, in particular, Jew-
ish and Muslim dietary restrictions.'o According to Barry, however,
"an appeal to religious liberty provides only spurious support for this
and other similar exemptions, because the law does not restrict relig-
ious liberty, only the ability to eat meat."10' Thus, on Barry's reckon-
ing, the claim for the religious dietary conduct exemption is not even
"about religious freedom," and as such there is no contrary interest to
be balanced, because Jews and Muslims can simply choose to be vege-
tarians."2 But this is a bit like saying that a law generally censoring
criticism of the President would not raise First Amendment concerns
because the press could simply choose to Write about someone else, 03
or that a policy restricting employment in the legal profession, in the
absence of some verifiable business necessity, to persons who had not
yet become eligible for Social Security benefits would not evoke age
discrimination concerns because such persons could simply choose to
become, say, caterers.l4
9 Id. at 39, 167.
Im The only exceptions are Nonvay, Sweden and Switzerland. See id. at 40-41.
101 Id. at 44.
0 Id. at 45.
13 In his opinion in Smith, Scalia suggests that "we have held that generally applicable laws
unconcerned with regulating speech that have the effect of interfering with speech do not
thereby become subject to compelling-interest analysis .... " Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (em-
phasis in original). But the case he cites for that proposition, Citizen Publishing Co. v. United
States, arose as a result of the application of a generally applicable antitrust law. 394 U.S. 131
(1969) (holding compelling interest analysis inapplicable). While an antitrust law might in-
deed be "unconcerned with regulating speech," Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3, a law censoring
political criticism, such as the one indicated in the text above, clearly could not. Indeed, as Mi-
chael McConnell has suggested, "exceptions from generally applicable laws are an established
part of the protections for free speech and press under the First Amendment. Indeed, the very
core of the free press clause-the freedom from prior restraints-can be seen as an exemption
from a form of regulation that can be applied to virtually every other commercial business."
McConnell, supra note 85, at 1138.
104 Of course, constitutional equal protection analysis does not subject either laws that overtly
discriminate on the basis of age, see, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (retirement classi-
fication tested by general equal protection standards), or, more generally, laws that dispropor-
tionately disadvantage even a protected class, see Smith, 494 U.S. at 872, 886 n.3 ("[R]ace-neutral
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The veracity of the first prong of Barry's pincer argument is con-
tingent upon his conception of religious liberty as encompassing only
the overt denial of some opportunity to a religious group, as, for ex-
ample, would be the case were a law to specify simply that 'Jews may
not eat meat."' ' 5 This position is consistent with Scalia's reasoning in
Smith, but reflects an unduly constricted conception of religious free-
dom. A religious person who is prevented from eating meat in virtue
of a generally applicable law is so precluded only upon the dishar-
monious confluence of religious and legal obligations. It makes little
sense to claim, as does Barry, that it is only an individual's religious
beliefs that constrain her actions. Where an individual must forego
an opportunity, otherwise open to all, in virtue of the combination of
a general law that conflicts with her religious beliefs, then that is pre-
cisely what religious freedom must be "about."' os Of course, this is
not to say that religious conduct exemptions must be forthcoming in
all or even many cases. 107 But it is to say that, if it is to mean anything
at all, free exercise of religion must entail more than the mere ab-
sence in general legislation of overt discrimination. It must entail an
assurance that the restriction imposed on individual liberty is justified
by the governmental interest asserted." s
The second prong of Barry's pincer argument is, at first glance,
more compelling. Often an exemption justified on the basis of relig-
ious freedom might indeed be justified on the basis of liberty, con-
ceived of more generally. There is, however, an important prudential
constraint on acknowledging such an extension. While Barry's gen-
eralized hostility to judicially crafted conduct exemptions eliminates
the need for him to consider this constraint, it nonetheless presents a
critical obstacle to his pincer argument once adjudicative remedies
are countenanced. In its more general form, the prudential objec-
tion derives most fundamentally from the casuistry that characterizes
laws that have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging a particular racial group do not
thereby become subject to compelling-interest analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause.... ."), to compelling interest scrutiny. Instead, the analogy is to the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2001), which does restrict facially neutral policies that
have a disproportionate impact on individuals on the basis of age to those required by business
necessity.
105 See BARRY, supra note 5, at 45 (contrasting a law specifically forbidding Sikhs to ride mo-
torcycles with a law requiring helmets for all motorcycle riders).
106 See id.
107 During the three decades immediately preceding Smith in which the Supreme Court in-
voked the compelling interest analysis, the Court actually ruled in favor of persons seeking re-
ligious conduct exemptions in only a handful of cases. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSITUIIONALLAW 1377 (6th ed. 2000).




the development of the common, and also constitutional, law.'°9 As
Lon Fuller wrote, "Adjudicative law emerges from the decision of ac-
tual controversies; it does not lay down rules in advance for the deci-
sion of cases, but waits for controversies to be brought before the
court for decision."110 Thus, even were we to agree that the interest
that justifies a particular religious conduct exemption would also jus-
tify overruling the law applied generally, the legitimacy of the law it-
self is normally not the case presented to the court for decision.
More particularly, judicial resolution of free exercise claims are sub-
ject to the now well-recognized duty to avoid, where possible, deci-
sions of constitutional questions."' As Justice Brandeis noted in his
concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority: "The
Court [has] developed, for its own governance in the cases con-
fessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has
avoided passing upon a large part of all of the constitutional ques-
tions pressed upon it for decision."1  Included among these rules,
the Court is "never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it;... [nor] to formulate a rule
of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied." 3 Hence, where the first prong of Barry's
pincer argument is reliant upon an unduly narrow conception of re-
ligious freedom, the second falters for its breadth on the "passive vir-
tues" of constitutional decisionmaking1 4 Justifiable religious con-
duct exemptions will both be more common than Barry is prepared
to allow and remain dependent on religious group membership.
C. Universalism and Association
Interestingly, Barry is not hostile to all group-differentiated rights.
In fact, Barry is quick throughout Culture and Equality to defend rights
that attach on the basis of disability, economic status or racial classifi-
109 See, e.g., SUNSIEIN, supra note 53, at 192 ("constitutional law ... results largely from casuis-
tical judgments").
110 FULLER, supra note 56, at 126.
I See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 107, at 106-07; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONS1ITUTIONAL LAW 327 (3d ed. 2000).
112 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis,J., concurring).
n1 Liverpool, N.Y. & Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39
(1885); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154-55 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Courts do not review issues, especially constitutional issues, until
they have to"). Of course, that this is a fundamental duty does not mean that it has always been
complied with. SeeTRIBE, supranote 111.
14 On the passive virtues, see ALEXANDERM.* BICEEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURTATTHE BAR OF POLICS 111-98 (2d ed. 1986); CASS P. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT
ATIME JUDICIALMINILISMONTHESUPREME COURT (1999).
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cation." It is only rights that attach on the basis of cultural member-
ship that give Barry pause. What justifies this different treatment?
According to Barry, it is only because disability, economic and af-
firmative action rights are universalistic and temporary that special
treatment for these categories of persons is justified." In contrast,
since cultural rights are particularistic and permanent these cannot
be countenanced by liberal justice.
But are these characterizations fair? In what sense may disability
and economic rights be considered mere stop-gaps? At least as pres-
ently conceptualized, such rights would seem highly unlikely to, as
Barry maintains, "make the need for that special treatment disappear
as rapidly as possible.' ' 7 Rights accorded on the basis of disability or
economic status surely are designed to remedy disadvantage, but, at
least without radical reconceptualization, they are as surely incapable
of eradicating the need for economic assistance or social accommo-
dation of disability. And while particular preferential programs may
indeed be designed to lead to their own termination, there is nothing
transitory about the need for affirmative governmental action.
Moreover, we might question whether it is really fair to characterize,
as Barry does, cultural rights as permanent? Members of a particular
religious or cultural group are only likely to assert claims for exemp-
tions or self-determination so long as there are in place generally ap-
plicable laws that frustrate their aspirations. A view that conceives of
religious and cultural group claims to special treatment as permanent
does so only by assuming contrary status quo majoritaian positions as
an appropriate baseline. ' Even putting this to one side, however,
Barry's concentration on the temporal characteristics of any of these
various group-differentiated rights seems misplaced for another rea-
son. It is not the relative duration of need that is critical to liberal jus-
tice but need itself.
Likewise, Barry's characterization of non-cultural group-
differentiated rights as universalistic, while deeming cultural a-ights as
particularistic, seems flawed. In what sense are economic, disability
and affirmative action rights universalistic? Notice that Barry does
not claim that such rights are "universal," because, of course, each of
"5 See BARRY, supra note 5, at 12-13, 114.
116 See id. at 12-13 ("[S]pecial treatment for members of disadvantaged groups is justifiable
only for as long as the inequality persists. We may say, therefore, that the objective of special
treatment for members of disadvantaged groups is to make the need for that special treatment
disappear as rapidly as possible .... It is instructive to contrast this with the case made by multi-
culturalists for granting special rights to groups defined by their distinctive cultural attributes.
These special rights will, according to their advocates, be needed permanently .....
17 Id. at 13.
11 Cf CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993) (criticizing the assumption that
the status quo is a neutral position in constitutional interpretation).
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these rights remains dependent on a particular classification; i.e., dis-
ability, economic status, or racial or ethnic group attachments. In
characterizing these non-cultural rights as "universalistic," then,
Barry's point seems to be that, though these rights are afforded only
to particular classes of persons, they nonetheless provide universally
desirable benefits: "the beneficiaries are assumed to be people who
want the same things as the rest of the population and simply lack the
resources that would enable them to enjoy more of those things."119
But notice how the universalistic nature of these desires depends in
part upon the level of abstraction at which they are conceptualized.
For instance, if we conceive of the desire of wheelchair-bound per-
sons for unimpeded entry to a municipal building as a general claim
for free accessibility, then the claim does seem universalistic. It is fair
to assume that most people value accessibility. However, if we con-
ceptualize the claim at a more narrow degree of abstraction-as a
specific claim, say, for a ramp-then the claim loses its universalistic
flavor. For we do not all strongly value the construction of ramps; in-
deed, one can imagine an (admittedly callous but not wholly unrea-
sonable) objection on aesthetic grounds. To be clear, my point is not
that we should conceptualize the claims of the disabled this narrowly,
only that the universalistic character of the claim is more contingent
than Barry lets on.
Now consider, at the other extreme, Barry's conceptualization of
religious conduct exemptions in Culture and Equality. In characteriz-
ing claims for religious exemptions as particularistic-for example, as
a highly particularized claim to wear a yarmulke or a turban' m-- Barry
has assumed a relatively lower level of abstraction. If, instead, as with
the non-cultural group claims above, he had conceptualized religious
conduct exemptions as general claims to act freely, then such claims• . ; . • .121
could lay claim to being "universalistic" as well. So what is it that
justifies this more specific conceptualization for cultural practices,
but the more general conceptualization for non-cultural aims? At
least as between cultural and non-cultural group-differentiated rights,
the forced move to a higher level of abstraction seems to be justified
119 BARRY, supra note 5, at 116; see also id. at 12 ("'[D]isadvantage' is defined in universal
terms-as the lack of things (resources and opportunities) whose possession would generally be
agreed to be advantageous....").
120 See id. at 33. Further, Barry's claim that wearing a yarmulke is merely a traditional custom
that gets "packaged" as a religious obligation in order to take advantage of the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of religion is, at best, "misleading." Letter from RabbiJeremy Kalmanof-
sky, Assistant Dean, Jewish Theological Seminary, to the author (July 5, 2001) (on file with
author).
121 Indeed, Barry notes the potentially universalistic character of claims to religious liberty as
the basis for the libertarian segment of his pincer argument, see supra notes 97-98 and accom-
panying text, but then seemingly denies that same potentiality when distinguishing cultural
from non-cultural group-differentiated rights.
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by nothing more than Barry's own perception of the rationality of
particular positions. There is, indeed, nothing inherently more "uni-
versalistic" about the group-differentiated rights of disability, eco-
nomic status and affinnative action of which Barry approves than
there is about the cultural rights which so strongly draw his ire.
In addition to distinguishing between non-cultural and cultural
group-differentiated rights on the basis of the universal desirability of
the benefits received, Barry also claims a critical distinction exists be-
tween non-cultural and cultural rights-claimants on the basis of the
capacity of the claimants themselves to enjoy the benefits secured by
such rights. In the absence of these rights, members of groups dif-
ferentiated according to disability, economic need or racial or ethnic
subjugation would "simply lack the resources" to take advantage of a
free social life.' On the other hand, Barry maintains that cultural
rights-claimants do not lack the capacity to enjoy the benefits af-
forded by the rights they seek. Rather, the benefits are denied them
on the basis of their own religiously or culturally based preferences.1'
Again, though, we need to be careful to discern precisely what it is
that Barry is claiming here. Barry is not claiming that religious belief
and cultural allegiance are merely matters of choice. He does not,
therefore, make the mistake of presuming that persons are wholly
free to choose their own attachments and commitments. Barry does,
however, equate beliefs with preferences for purposes of discerning
the justifiability of cultural rights, and he does so specifically in light
of the common distinction beliefs and preferences share as against
choices.
Barry's argument is that since both beliefs and preferences (his
example is a preference for vanilla ice cream) are "almost impossible
to change," then "beliefs and preferences are in the same boat" vis-t-
vis rights-claims.'2" Insofar as we would not afford a group-
differentiated right merely on the basis that the members of a par-
ticular group "have a preference for vanilla over strawberry ice
cream, we should also not afford a group-differentiated right on
the basis of religious belief or cultural practice. Instead, when laws of
general applicability place persons at a disadvantage in virtue of their
religiously or culturally-based attachments, we are to view the disad-
vantage merely as a morally unregrettable "side-effect" of the law, no
different, as a matter of justice, from, for example, the "much more
severe impact [that laws against sexual violence have] on those who
12 BARRY, supra note 5, at 116.
123 Id. at 32-36.
124 Id. at 35.
12 Id. at 36.
126 Id.
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justice.ss And were a particularly strongly held or highly unique per-
sonal preference to constitute an aspect of an individual's identity,
that would not represent an argument against affording expansive re-
ligious and cultural freedoms. Indeed, in such a case the law argua-
bly should seek, again constrained by an appropriate balancing test, a
just accommodation of the preference.TM
There is a final leg to Barry's universalist attack on cultural rights.
He argues that one mark in favor of non-cultural group-differentiated
rights is their assimilationist effect on otherwise socially marginalized
individuals. "If such policies succeed," Barry writes, "they will tend to
decrease social isolation and enable their beneficiaries to make the
transition all the way into the mainstream society." " This is a valid
claim; the inclusionary influence of disability, economic and affirma-
tive action rights is indeed conducive to liberal virtue. Barry is also
correct to note that this "assimilationist virtuous circle is in sharp con-
trast with the rationale of the kind of Froup-based policies advocated
by the theorists of multiculturalism."l The rights-claims asserted by
religious and cultural group members are claims not to inclusion but
to self-exclusion. Where Barry makes a wrong turn, however, is in as-
suming that the non-assimilationist, self-exclusionary nature of cul-
tural rights is contrary to liberal values.
Barry does recognize that an essential relationship exists between
group attachments and the capacity of human beings for living a
good life. He appreciates "that much of every normal individual's
well-being derives from membership in associations and communi-
ties."' 37 But from this recognition, Barry draws only the important,
but also very limited, conclusion that groups, as corporate entities,
should be afforded rights of self-government. Thus, so long as mem-
bership in a given association remains voluntary, the internal policies
M See, e.g., Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984) (discussing familial
and closely associated bonds: "[c]ertain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in
the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and
beliefs .... Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safe-
guards the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of lib-
erty."); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that "individuals define themselves" through freely chosen relationships).
134 Such a view would be broadly consistent with Mill's harm principle. See JOHN STUART
MILT, ON LIBERTY 68 (Penguin Books 1985) (1859) ("the sole end for which mankind are war-
ranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their num-
ber is self-protection... the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others"); see also
GEORGE KATMB, THE INNER OCEAN: INDIVIDUALISM AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 13 (1992)
("Rights-based individualism has a prima facie commitment to the greatest possible amount of
such legally allowed 'self-regarding' activity... ").
13 BARRY, supra note 5, at 116.
I S 6 I &
I I at 117.
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are strongly attracted to rape and paedophilia."' 7 Indeed, according
to Barry, the costs imposed on members of religious and cultural
groups result not from the generally applicable laws that impinge
upon their practices but from the practitioners' own "expensive
tastes. ' '12s As such, general laws that have a differential impact on per-
sons in virtue of their religious beliefs or cultural practices are, as a
matter of justice, no more a cause of concern than are, say, general
traffic laws that have a differential impact on persons in light of their
preference for fast cars.'29
It should be obvious by now that this is all just a bit too facile. The
commonality that beliefs and preferences share in contradistinction
with choices demonstrates no more (and no less) than that neither
beliefs nor preferences are wholly subject to free will. But this rela-
tively slim concurrence provides no traction on the serious issues pre-
sented by the claims of religious and cultural practitioners. The posi-
tive legal argument for the differential treatment of beliefs and
preferences is that we do not, as a general matter, privilege personal
preference in the form of constitutional rights, whereas the Constitu-
tion does privilege religious and associational freedom.' 30 Indeed, the
Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder noted this distinction when it
suggested that "the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a
matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction,
shared by an organized group and intimately related to daily living." 3'
From a normative perspective, too, beliefs are critically distin-
guishable from preferences. Religious beliefs and cultural commit-
ments constitute aspects of our selves in a far deeper sense than do
most personal preferences. An individual's preference for a particu-
lar flavor of ice cream is unlikely to constitute a meaningful aspect of
that individual's identity, whereas that same individual's attachment
to her fellow Christians or to her tribe is indeed likely to play a cen-
tral role in her self-definition. 32 Affording individuals the maximum
degree of freedom to construct their own identities, in the absence of
a compelling contrary rationale, is a crucial commitment of liberal
12 Id. at 25, 34.
128 Id. at 40.
129 See id. at 34.
130 An expansive view of constitutional freedom might indeed encompass personal prefer-
ences, say within the substantive due process doctrine. But in that event, too, preferences obvi-
ously would not provide the analogy Barry seeks.
131 Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
132 1 do not mean to suggest that there is not a personal dimension to individual identity,
only that social categories like religion or disability are more critical markers for how an indi-
vidual is perceived, both by herself and by society. For a discussion of the collective and per-
sonal dimensions of identity, see Appiah, supra note 65, at 151. For discussions of the impact of
social perceptions on self-understanding, see sources cited supra note 68.
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of that association may, consistent with liberal justice, be either or
both illiberal or undemocratic.'ss But associational liberty entails
more than freedom collectively to construct group governance or
membership policies. For all his concentration on group associa-
tional rights, Barry fails to acknowledge the critical relationship that
exists between group association and individual freedom. Freedom of
association is, as George Kateb has written, "integral to a free human
life, to being a free person. Picking one's company is part of living as
one likes; living as one likes (provided one does not injure the vital
claims of others) is what being free means." 39 Indeed, we have al-
ready noticed the strong sense in which associative ties contribute to
the constitution of individual identity. It is not far to see, then, the
sense in which cultural rights are essential to liberal self-definition.
IV. CONCLUSION: LIBERALISM AND MEMBERSHIP
Human identity is deeply rooted in social relationships. As Han-
nah Arendt wrote: "The moment we want to say who somebody is,
our very vocabulary leads us astray into saying what he is; we get en-
tangled in a description of qualities he necessarily shares with others
like him. .. his specific uniqueness escapes us. Indeed, we are
born immediately into attachments. Our families, our communities,
141our religions, our nations inform our sense of who we are. That in-
dividuals are, in part, constituted by social forces, however, does not
eliminate the possibility of self-invention, or the possibility of being
an autonomous self.14 But autonomy has preconditions. A defining
aspect of liberalism is that individuals should be free, in virtue of
their own successive choices, to chart their own life-courses.14 In-
cluded among the choices that individuals must make are which cul-
tural attachments they will maintain, sever and newly establish.14 The
133 See i& at 146-62 (outlining a theory of group rights and applying it to rights of free asso-
ciation).
139 Kateb, supra note 11, at 36.
140 HANNAHARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDMON181 (1958).
1 For discussions of the relevance of encumbered identities and liberal justice to political
theory and public policy, see MICHAELJ. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY"S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OFA PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 11-13 (1996); see generally MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISMAND
THELINMISOFJUSTCE (2d ed. 1998).
142 See RAZ, supra note 4, at 155-56, 369-73 ("To be sure our well-being is not served by proj-
ects we are coerced into unless we come willingly to embrace them.").
143 At least insofar as their actions fall short of harming others in relevant ways. For the clas-
sic statement of this principle, see MILL, supra note 134.
144 Of course, we can never really know which, if any, of our attachments truly result from
free will. But that this is not wholly subject to choice, does not mean that it is never or to no
extent subject to choice. George Kateb has suggested that "[t]he mere fact that we are not born
as adults makes the subject [of free will] elusive, probably forever." KATEB, supra note 134, at
18. With Sidgwick, I note only that: "The difficulties connected with this question have been
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free maintenance, severance and establishment of cultural attach-
ments by individuals, however, is not achievable in the absence of cul-
tural rights. Cultural rights constitute the social groups from which
individual members derive aspects of their identities.' Social differ-
entiation is inherent in the very structure of this form of right, for
cultural rights are afforded only to a sub-group of individuals. In the
absence of this associational freedom-this liberal right of self-
exclusion-an aspect of the identities of the rights-claimants would
be preempted. Cultural rights are (some of) the instruments of lib-
eral self-definition. An expansive conception of cultural rights is thus
among the preconditions for self-invention.
While, as Barry claims, classifying persons according to group
characteristics risks the grave error of essentialism-or the error of
reducing the conception of any individual member's identity to a sin-
gle characteristic-merely recognizing that group affiliation plays an
integral role in the process of self-definition is a far cry from treating
the group trait as essential.'4 We can appreciate the liberal virtue of
associative identity without detracting from the proper vision of indi-
viduality as replete with additive, fragmented and even contradictory
attachments and concerns. 147 Yet the preconditions of liberal self-
invention run counter to the sort of radically universalistic theory that
Barry posits in Culture and Equality. In unduly restricting cultural at-
tachments and practices, Barry's proposals reflect an illiberal theory
of membership that obstructs rather than fosters self-definition.
Of course, one of the marks of an important book is its capacity to
provoke further ideas. In this sense, then, Barry's latest book is sig-
nificant not just in virtue of the gulf it fills in the multicultural discus-
sions of the last few years, but also in virtue of the debates it is sure to
provoke in the next few.
proved by long dialectical experience to be so great, that I am anxious to confine them within
as strict limits as I can, and keep as much of my subject as possible free from their perturbing
influence." HENRYSIDGWICK, THE METHOD OF ETHICS 57 (7th ed. 1981).
145 See Mitnick, supra note 65 (proposing that a pure "constitutive right ... inherently differ-
entiates among persons and so directly constitutes aspects of human identity").
14 See BARRY, supra note 5, at 11 (comparing the essentialism of multiculturalism to that of
the counter-Enlightenment).
147 See Social Theory and the Politics of Identity, in SOCAL THEORYVAND THE POLITICS OF IDENnHY
9, 27-29 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1994).
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